When tainted money should fund public goods: fundraising professional and public moral preferences.

Philanthropy is essential to public goods such as education and research, arts and culture, and the provision of services to those in need. Providers of public goods commonly struggle with the dilemma of whether to accept donations from morally tainted donors. Ethicists also disagree on how to manage tainted donations. Forgoing such donations reduces opportunities for societal well-being and advancement; however, accepting them can damage institutional and individual reputations. Half of professional fundraisers have faced tainted donors, but only around a third of their institutions had relevant policies (n = 52). Here, we draw on two large samples of US laypeople (ns = 2,019; 2,566) and a unique sample of experts (professional fundraisers, n = 694) to provide empirical insights into various aspects of tainted donations that affect moral acceptability: the nature of the moral taint (criminal or morally ambiguous behavior), donation size, anonymity, and institution type. We find interesting patterns of convergence (rejecting criminal donations), divergence (professionals' aversion to large tainted donations), and indifference (marginal role of anonymity) across the samples. Laypeople also applied slightly higher standards to universities and museums than to charities. Our results provide evidence of how complex moral trade-offs are resolved differentially, and can thus motivate and inform policy development for institutions dealing with controversial donors.

Fear facilitates utilitarian moral judgments: Evidence from a moral judgment task.

Previous research on moral judgment (MJ) has focused on understanding the cognitive processes and emotional factors that influence different types of moral judgment tasks, such as personal and impersonal dilemmas. However, few studies have distinguished between the emotions related to cognition and the complex emotions specifically caused by MJ tasks. This gap in knowledge is important to address to have a better understanding of how emotions influence moral judgment. The aim of this study was to investigate the influence of fear and the role of moral emotions on MJ. Data were collected from 145 participants through jsPsych and analyzed using mixed-model analysis of variance (ANOVA) and correlation analysis. The study found that individuals who were triggered by the fear increased the number of utilitarian moral judgments in personal moral scenarios and lengthened the cognitive process, but not in impersonal moral dilemmas. Hence, we speculate that fear may play a cognitive role in personal moral dilemmas and an emotional role in impersonal moral dilemmas. Another finding is that the complex moral emotions arising from the moral decision-making process may affect the effectiveness of fear and potentially influence moral judgments. However, this study adopts a cautious attitude toward these discoveries, and further verification of this hypothesis should be conducted in the future.

Community Violence Exposure and Bullying in Mexican Adolescents. The Mediating Role of Moral Emotions.

Community characteristics can explain differences in bullying rates between schools. Underpinned by the social-ecological model, this study examined the relationships among community violence exposure (CVE), moral emotions (guilt and sympathy), and bullying in adolescents. We also explored the moderating role of gender in these relationships. The sample included 915 adolescents (48.6% female and 51.4% male) aged 11-16 (M age = 13.76, SD = 0.82). Students responded to the self-report measures. We used a latent variable structural equation modeling (SEM) approach to examine the relationships between variables. The SEM indicated that CVE was negatively associated with moral emotions (guilt and sympathy) and positively associated with bullying. In addition, CVE had a negative indirect association with bullying through their negative relationship with moral emotions. The structural model is equivalent for both genders, suggesting gender does not moderate these relationships. These findings indicate that CVE are associated with differences in school bullying rates.

Do Moral Beliefs Motivate Action?

Do moral beliefs motivate action? To answer this question, extant arguments have considered hypothetical cases of association (dissociation) between agents' moral beliefs and actions. In this paper, I argue that this approach can be improved by studying people's actual moral beliefs and actions using empirical research methods. I present three new studies showing that, when the stakes are high, associations between participants' moral beliefs and actions are actually explained by co-occurring but independent moral emotions. These findings suggest that moral beliefs themselves have little or no motivational force, supporting the Humean picture of moral motivation.

Guilt, Shame and Academic Misconduct.

Moral and self-conscious emotions like guilt and shame can function as internal negative experiences that punish or deter bad behaviour. Individual differences exist in people's tendency to experience guilt and shame. Being disposed to experience guilt and/or shame may predict students' expectations of their emotional reactions to engaging in immoral behaviour in the form of academic misconduct, and thus dissuade students from intending to engage in this behaviour. In this study, students' (n = 459) guilt and shame proneness, their expectations of feeling guilt and shame if they engaged in academic misconduct, and their intentions to engage in academic misconduct were measured. Three of the four facets of the guilt and shame proneness scale [GASP: Guilt-Negative-Behavior-Evaluation (NBE), Guilt-Repair, Shame-Negative-Self-Evaluation (NSE)] had significant negative correlations with academic misconduct intentions, and these relationships were mediated by anticipating shame and guilt related to engaging in academic misconduct. These results suggest that for some students expecting to experience negative moral emotions when engaging in academic misconduct may protect them from breaching ethical assessment rules.

The Neural Signatures of Shame, Embarrassment, and Guilt: A Voxel-Based Meta-Analysis on Functional Neuroimaging Studies.

Self-conscious emotions, such as shame and guilt, play a fundamental role in regulating moral behaviour and in promoting the welfare of society. Despite their relevance, the neural bases of these emotions are uncertain. In the present meta-analysis, we performed a systematic literature review in order to single out functional neuroimaging studies on healthy individuals specifically investigating the neural substrates of shame, embarrassment, and guilt. Seventeen studies investigating the neural correlates of shame/embarrassment and seventeen studies investigating guilt brain representation met our inclusion criteria. The analyses revealed that both guilt and shame/embarrassment were associated with the activation of the left anterior insula, involved in emotional awareness processing and arousal. Guilt-specific areas were located within the left temporo-parietal junction, which is thought to be involved in social cognitive processes. Moreover, specific activations for shame/embarrassment involved areas related to social pain (dorsal anterior cingulate and thalamus) and behavioural inhibition (premotor cortex) networks. This pattern of results might reflect the distinct action tendencies associated with the two emotions.

When caring breeds contempt: The impact of moral emotions on healthcare professionals' commitment during a pandemic.

The novel coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic is a major heath crisis that continues to impact healthcare organizations worldwide. As infection rates surged, there was a global shortage of personal protective equipment, critical medications, ventilators, and hospital beds, meaning that healthcare professionals faced increasingly difficult workplace conditions. In this conceptual study, we argue these situations can lead to healthcare professionals experiencing moral emotions - defined as specific emotions which relate, or occur in response, to the interest or welfare of others - towards their organizations. This paper explores the three moral emotions of contempt, anger and disgust, and their potential influence on healthcare professionals' workplace commitment in the context of a pandemic. Drawing from the moral emotions and organizational commitment literature, we develop a process model to demonstrate how healthcare professionals' affective and continuous commitment are likely to decrease while, paradoxically, normative, and professional commitment may become amplified. The possible potential for positive outcomes from negative moral emotions is discussed, followed by theoretical and practical contributions of the model, and finally, directions for future research.

Good death disrupted: Nurses' moral emotions navigating clinical and public health ethics during the first wave of COVID-19 pandemic.

AIM: To explore the moral emotions that frontline nurses navigated in endeavouring to ensure a 'good death' for hospital patients and care home residents during the first wave of the COVID-19 pandemic. BACKGROUND: Under normal circumstances, frontline staff are focused on clinical ethics, which foreground what is best for individuals and families. Public health crises such as a pandemic require staff to adapt rapidly to focus on what benefits communities, at times compromising individual well-being and autonomy. Visitor restrictions when people were dying provided vivid exemplars of this ethical shift and the moral emotions nurses encountered with the requirement to implement this change. METHODS: Twenty-nine interviews were conducted with nurses in direct clinical care roles. Data were analysed thematically informed by the theoretical concepts of a good death and moral emotions. RESULTS: The data set highlighted that moral emotions such as sympathy, empathy, distress and guilt were integral to the decisions participants described in striving for a good palliative experience. Four themes were identified in the data analysis: nurses as gatekeepers; ethical tensions and rule bending; nurses as proxy family members; separation and sacrifice. CONCLUSIONS: Participants reflected on morally compromising situations and highlighted agency through emotionally satisfying workarounds and collegial deliberations that enabled them to believe that they were party to painful but morally justifiable decisions. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE PROFESSION AND PATIENT CARE: Nurses are required to implement national policy changes that may disrupt notions of best practice and therefore be experienced as a moral wrong. In navigating the moral emotions accompanying this shift, nurses benefit from compassionate leadership and ethics education to support team cohesion enabling nurses to prevail. PUBLIC CONTRIBUTION: Twenty-nine frontline registered nurses participated in the qualitative interviews that inform this study. REPORTING METHOD: The study adhered to the Consolidated Criteria for Reporting Qualitative Research checklist.

Expressions of moral disgust reflect both disgust and anger.

ABSTRACTPeople often appear to conflate anger and disgust, seemingly using expressions of both emotions interchangeably in response to moral violations. Yet, anger and moral disgust differ in their antecedents and consequences. These empirical observations are associated with two broad theoretical perspectives: one describes expressions of moral disgust as metaphors for anger, whereas the other describes moral disgust as functionally distinct from anger. Both accounts have received empirical support from separate and seemingly inconsistent literatures. The present study seeks to resolve this inconsistency by focusing on the different ways moral emotions have been measured. We formalise three theoretical models of moral emotions: one in which expressions of disgust are purely associated with anger (but not physiological disgust), one in which disgust and anger are fully separated and have distinct functions, and an integrative model that accommodates both metaphorical use in language and distinctive function. We test these models on responses to moral violations (four studies; N = 1608). Our results suggest that moral disgust has distinct functions, but that expressions of moral disgust are sometimes used to convey moralistic anger. These findings have implications for the theoretical status and measurement of moral emotions.

Moral Emotions and Their Brain Structural Correlates Across Neurodegenerative Disorders.

BACKGROUND: Although social cognition is compromised in patients with neurodegenerative disorders such as behavioral variant frontotemporal dementia (bvFTD) and Alzheimer's disease (AD), research on moral emotions and their neural correlates in these populations is scarce. No previous study has explored the utility of moral emotions, compared to and in combination with classical general cognitive state tools, to discriminate bvFTD from AD patients. OBJECTIVE: To examine self-conscious (guilt and embarrassment) and other-oriented (pity and indignation) moral emotions, their subjective experience, and their structural brain underpinnings in bvFTD (n = 31) and AD (n = 30) patients, compared to healthy controls (n = 37). We also explored the potential utility of moral emotions measures to discriminate bvFTD from AD. METHODS: We used a modified version of the Moral Sentiment Task measuring the participants' accuracy scores and their emotional subjective experiences. RESULTS: bvFTD patients exhibited greater impairments in self-conscious and other-oriented moral emotions as compared with AD patients and healthy controls. Moral emotions combined with general cognitive state tools emerged as useful measures to discriminate bvFTD from AD patients. In bvFTD patients, lower moral emotions scores were associated with lower gray matter volumes in caudate nucleus and inferior and middle temporal gyri. In AD, these scores were associated with lower gray matter volumes in superior and middle frontal gyri, middle temporal gyrus, inferior parietal lobule and supramarginal gyrus. CONCLUSION: These findings contribute to a better understanding of moral emotion deficits across neurodegenerative disorders, highlighting the potential benefits of integrating this domain into the clinical assessment.

See the self through others' eyes: The development of moral emotions in young children with autism spectrum disorder.

Despite the important social functions of moral emotions, they are understudied in the autism spectrum disorder (ASD) population. This three-wave longitudinal study is among the first to examine the development of moral emotions and their associations with theory of mind in 3- to 7-year-old children with ASD, using observational tasks. One hundred and forty-two children (52 with ASD) were followed over a period of 2 years. We found that while the expressions of shame and guilt remained stable in non-ASD children, they decreased with age in children with ASD. No group differences were found in the levels or the developmental trajectories of pride. Besides, better false-belief understanding was uniquely related to the expressions of pride in children with ASD. Our findings highlight the importance of enhancing understanding of moral emotion development and related factors in children with ASD.

Neuropsychological Comparison of Guilt and Grief: A Review of Guilt Aspects in Prolonged Grief Disorder.

Taking an integrative approach toward developmental psychology and neurophysiology, this review selects findings from the psychological and medical literature on guilt and bereavement that are relevant to considering whether and how guilt contributes to the development of prolonged grief disorder (PGD) in bereaved persons. Mention of guilt is ubiquitous in literature on general grief and PGD, including 54 articles related to the neuropsychological development and manifestations of guilt and grief, as well as their neuroimaging correlates, that met scoping review criteria. However, mechanisms connecting guilt to development of PGD are scarce. Aspects of guilt are conceptually connected to many PGD criteria, opening avenues to explore treatment of PGD by targeting guilt. Positive and prosocial aspects of guilt are especially neglected in the treatment of psychiatric disorders, and consideration of these aspects may improve interventions for PGD such as complicated grief treatment.

Responses of the public towards the government in times of crisis.

We experimentally investigate how and when the public responds to government actions during times of crisis. Public reactions are shown to follow different processes, depending on whether government performs in exemplary or unsatisfactory ways to the COVID-19 pandemic. The 'how' question is addressed by proposing that negative moral emotions mediate public reactions to bad government actions, and positive moral emotions mediate reactions to good government actions. Tests of mediation are conducted while taking into account attitudes and trust in the government as rival hypotheses. The 'when' question is studied by examining self-regulatory moderators governing the experience of moral emotions and their effects. These include conspiracy beliefs, political ideology, attachment coping styles and collective values. A total of 357 citizens of a representative sample of adult Norwegians were randomly assigned to two experimental groups and a control group, where complaining, putting pressure on the government and compliance to Covid-19 policies were dependent variables. The findings show that negative moral emotions mediate the effects of government doing badly on complaining and pressuring the government, with conspiracy beliefs moderating the experience of negative moral emotions and attachment coping moderating the effects of negative moral emotions. The results also show that positive moral emotions mediate the effects of government doing well on compliance with COVID-19 regulations, with political ideology moderating the experience of positive moral emotions and collective values moderating the effects of positive moral emotions.

The TRIBE model: How socioemotional processes fuel end-of-life treatment in the United States.

Prior interventions have repeatedly failed to decrease the prescription and receipt of treatments and procedures that confer more harm than benefit at the End-of-Life (EoL); new approaches to intervention are needed. Ideally, future interventions would be informed by a social-ecological conceptual model that explains EoL healthcare utilization patterns, but current models ignore two facts: (1) healthcare is an inherently social activity, involving clinical teams and patients' social networks, and (2) emotions influence social activity. To address these omissions, we scaffolded Terror Management Theory and Socioemotional Selectivity Theory to create the Transtheoretical Model of Irrational Biomedical Exuberance (TRIBE). Based on Terror Management Theory, TRIBE suggests that the prospect of patient death motivates healthcare teams to conform to a biomedical norm of care, even when clinicians believe that biomedical interventions will likely be unhelpful. Based on Socioemotional Selectivity Theory, TRIBE suggests that the prospect of dwindling time motivates families to prioritize emotional goals, and leads patients to consent to disease-directed treatments they know will likely be unhelpful, as moral emotions motivate deference to the perceived emotional needs of their loved ones. TRIBE is unique among models of healthcare utilization in its acknowledgement that moral emotions and processes (e.g., shame, compassion, regret-avoidance) influence healthcare delivery, patients' interactions with family members, and patients' outcomes. TRIBE is especially relevant to potentially harmful EoL care in the United States, and it also offers insights into the epidemics of overtreatment in healthcare settings worldwide. By outlining the role of socioemotional processes in the care of persons with serious conditions, TRIBE underscores the critical need for psychological innovation in interventions, health policy and research on healthcare utilization.

Shame and the moral emotions: Issues in cross-cultural clinical practice.

RATIONALE AND METHOD: Three interrelated topics are examined in this paper. These are (1) the study of shame and the other moral emotions (guilt, regret, remorse) as it relates to clinical approaches in cross-cultural psychiatry; (2) the examination of methodological problems and choices in researching and treating shame in persons who have experienced forced departure from their country of origin and immigration into ambivalent host countries, in which shame experienced as part of the power differentials between host and refugee is added to whatever shaming experiences the person endured within the violence of the country of origin; and (3) an examination of the suitability of evidence-based psychiatry (EBP) and narrative psychiatry as vehicles for providing clinical assessment and care that is scientifically rigorous and also establishes a reciprocally respectful relationship between two humans working on a single task of developing and understanding the life story of the person who has experienced the stresses of life as a refugee. DISCUSSION: The three topics outlined above (shame viewed at many levels; experience of entering and receiving hospitality from a host country fraught with political resentment and bureaucratic institutional procedures, yet holding the possibility of rebuilding a life with the support and assistance of the healthcare professions and other agencies; the limitations of EBP and suitability of Narrative Psychiatry are discussed at theoretical and practical levels as these domains interact in seeking, through a true partnership, the common ethical goals of providing the best course of action for this patient at this moment. CONCLUSIONS: We present two case vignettes as illustrations of how shame or respect arises and is responded to in the context of a psychiatry session.

How Personal Values Count in Misleading News Sharing with Moral Content.

The present study investigates the personal factors underlying online sharing of moral misleading news by observing the interaction between personal values, communication bias, credibility evaluations, and moral emotions. Specifically, we hypothesized that self-transcendence and conservation values may differently influence the sharing of misleading news depending on which moral domain is activated and that these are more likely to be shared when moral emotions and perceived credibility increase. In a sample of 132 participants (65% female), we tested SEMs on misleading news regarding violations in five different moral domains. The results suggest that self-transcendence values hinder online sharing of misleading news, while conservation values promote it; moreover, news written with a less blatantly biased linguistic frame are consistently rated as more credible. Lastly, more credible and emotionally activating news is more likely to be shared online.

Guilt is effectively induced by a written auto-biographical essay but not reduced by experimental pain.

Introduction: The aim of the present study was (1) to validate the method of guilt-induction by means of a written auto-biographical essay and (2) to test whether experimental pain is apt to alleviate the mental burden of guilt, a concept receiving support from both empirical research and clinical observation. Methods: Three independent groups of healthy male participants were recruited. Group allocation was not randomized but within group pain/sham administration was counterbalanced over the two test-days. Groups were tested in the following consecutive order: Group A: guilt induction, heat-pain/sham, N = 59; Group B: guilt induction, cold-pressure-pain/sham, N = 43; Group C: emotionally neutral induction, heat-pain/sham, N = 39. Guilt was induced on both test-days in group A and B before pain/sham administration. Visual analog scale (VAS) guilt ratings immediately after pain/sham stimulation served as the primary outcome. In a control group C the identical heat-pain experiment was performed like in group A but a neutral emotional state was induced. Results: A consistently strong overall effect of guilt-induction (heat-pain: p < 0.001, effect size r = 0.71; CPT-pain p < 0.001, r = 0.67) was found when compared to the control-condition (p = 0.25, r = 0.08). As expected, heat- and cold-pressure-stimuli were highly painful in all groups (p < 0.0001, r = 0.89). However, previous research supporting the hypothesis that pain is apt to reduce guilt was not replicated. Conclusion: Although guilt-induction was highly effective on both test-days no impact of pain on behavioral guilt-ratings in healthy individuals could be identified. Guilt induction per se did not depend on the order of testing. The result questions previous experimental work on the impact of pain on moral emotions.

Shame Broadcasts Social Norms: The Positive Social Effects of Shame on Norm Acquisition and Normative Behavior.

How does shame affect social cohesion? Prior work has drawn divergent conclusions to this question because shame can spur maladaptive behaviors for people who experience it. However, past work has overlooked the interindividual effects of shame-how one's expression of shame affects people who witness it. We investigated these social-learning effects of shame and identified norm transmission as a reliable route by which shame facilitates social cohesion. Across five studies and two supplemental studies with U.S.-based adult participants (N = 3,726), we manipulated whether someone conveys shame, no specific emotion, or other discrete emotions regarding their behavior. We then assessed the effect of this emotional expression on participants' norm inferences and norm-conforming behavior. We found that shame broadcasts particularly strong signals about social norms, and people adjust their behavior to align with these norms. We discuss how these findings challenge common conclusions about shame and generate insights about shame's influence on social life.

Predicting Pro-environmental Intention and Behavior Based on Justice Sensitivity, Moral Disengagement, and Moral Emotions - Results of Two Quota-Sampling Surveys.

The effects of climate change lead to increasing social injustice and hence justice is intrinsically linked to a socio-ecological transformation. In this study, we investigate whether justice sensitivity motivates pro-environmental intention (PEI) and behavior (PEB) and, if so, to what extent emotions and moral disengagement determine this process. For this purpose, we conducted two quota-sampling surveys (Study 1: N = 174, Study 2: N = 880). Multiple regression analyses in both studies suggest that a higher perception of injustice from a perpetrator's, beneficiary's, and observer's perspective is associated with an increased PEI. However, moral disengagement best predicted PEB and PEI. Guilt and authentic pride were found to be emotional predictors of PEI. Additionally, mediation analyses demonstrated that guilt mediates the connection between both perpetrator and beneficiary sensitivity and PEI. These results suggest that when the predominant originators of climate change (i.e., individuals from industrialized countries) perceive global climate injustice from the perspective of a beneficiary or a perpetrator, they experience guilt and have a higher PEI. Based on this mechanism, it seems promising to render global injustice more salient to those responsible for activities that lead to climate change to motivate them to adapt their behavior. The role of moral disengagement and victim sensitivity as barriers to pro-environmental behavior is discussed in this context.

Caring animals and care ethics.

Are there nonhuman animals who behave morally? In this paper I answer this question in the affirmative by applying the framework of care ethics to the animal morality debate. According to care ethics, empathic care is the wellspring of morality in humans. While there have been several suggestive analyses of nonhuman animals as empathic, much of the literature within the animal morality debate has marginalized analyses from the perspective of care ethics. In this paper I examine care ethics to extract its core commitments to what is required for moral care: emotional motivation that enables the intentional meeting of another's needs, and forward-looking responsibility in particular relationships. What is not required, I argue, are metarepresentational capacities or the ability to scrutinize one's reasons for action, and thus being retrospectively accountable. This minimal account of moral care is illustrated by moral practices of parental care seen in many nonhuman animal species. In response to the worry that parental care in nonhuman animals lacks all evaluation and is therefore nonmoral I point to cultural differences in human parenting and to normativity in nonhuman animals.